2014年05月23日
原発事故証言―再稼働より全容公開だ
May 21, 2014
EDITORIAL: Startling Fukushima testimony raises grave questions
原発事故証言―再稼働より全容公開だ
When faced with a life-threatening crisis, humans do not necessarily behave according to set rules. Some will do anything to save their skins. Without factoring in this possibility, is it ever possible to design something that is guaranteed to be safe?
危機が極まった局面では、人間は必ずしも規則通りには動かない。自らの命を優先する者もいる。それを計算に入れずに、どう安全を設計できるのか。
We raise the issue because of a document that recently came to light. It is a record of statements made by Masao Yoshida, who was the manager of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant at the time of the March 2011 disaster. Yoshida died last July of esophageal cancer.
This valuable document covers exchanges Yoshida made when he was questioned by the government's Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Co.
福島第一原発の元所長、吉田昌郎（まさお）氏（昨年１２月に死去）の証言を記録した「吉田調書」の内容が明らかになった。
The document begs a fundamental question: Is it right to entrust operations of nuclear power plants to electric power companies that are private enterprises?
貴重な証言を読むと、根源的な疑問が浮かぶ。原発とは、一民間企業である電力会社に任せていいものなのか、と。
According to the document, Yoshida said that on March 15, four days after the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami crippled the Fukushima No. 1 plant, fears were being voiced that the plant's No. 2 reactor containment vessel was damaged or destroyed. At that most critical juncture, according to the document, about 90 percent of plant workers defied Yoshida's orders and fled to the Fukushima No. 2 plant, about 10 kilometers away, to seek temporary refuge.
政府の事故調査委員会による調書によると、発生４日後だった。原子炉そのものが壊れるかもしれない。その最悪の事態が心配されたとき、所員の９割が命令に反して１０キロ余り離れた別の原発に一時退避したという。
Doubts have always existed about the efficacy of disaster response measures at nuclear power plants. Would any utility really order its workers to risk their lives and keep performing their duties? How many workers would the utility be able to continue to secure during an accident? At Fukushima, these questions were no longer just theoretical.
原発の事故対応をめぐる疑問は以前からあった。電力会社は原発運転員らに「命が危なくても残って作業せよ」と命じられるのか。どこまで必要な人員を確保し続けられるのか。そう危惧される事態が実際に起きていたのである。
The safety of commercial nuclear power plants today can be maintained only if plant operators deal appropriately with any mishap. The more serious the situation, the more people are needed to contain the crisis. But unlike Self-Defense Forces personnel, police officers and firefighters, who are all special-status government workers, nuclear power plant operators are private-sector workers.
現在の商業用原発は、異常が起きた場合、運転員が適切に対応して初めて安全が保たれる。深刻な状況になればなるほど、対応には人手が必要になる。だが、自衛官や警察官、消防士など特殊な公務員と違い、原発運転員は民間従業員である。
The 50 or so workers who stayed at the Fukushima No. 1 plant while the crisis unfolded came to be called the "Fukushima 50" and were lauded around the world for their heroic dedication. But there is no guarantee such heroism will come into play when the next nuclear crisis occurs. The document raises grave questions.
当時、現場に残って献身的に働いた約５０人は「フクシマ・フィフティー」と呼ばれ、世界から称賛された。だが、次の事故でもそんな英雄的精神が発揮される保証はない。吉田調書は重大な問題を投げかけている。
Yet, Shunichi Tanaka, chairman of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, was reportedly not even aware of the document's existence. We find it extremely hard to understand that the head of this organization, created to prevent a recurrence of nuclear crisis, was not familiar with all the details from the outset of the Fukushima disaster.
ところが原子力規制委員会の田中俊一委員長は調書の存在自体知らなかったという。事故を繰り返さないために生まれた規制組織が、事故の詳細を把握していないとは理解に苦しむ。
The possibility of plant workers deserting en masse during a crisis was not even raised during discussions last year on establishing new regulatory standards for nuclear power plants.
原発の新しい規制基準が昨年つくられる過程でも、事故時の運転員たちの離脱は、その可能性さえ議論されてこなかった。
Yotaro Hatamura, an expert in the science of failures and former chairman of the government's investigation committee on the Fukushima accident, stated in the overview of the investigation report: "Whatever may happen will happen. Whatever is thought to never happen will also happen." Has nobody heeded Hatamura's warning?
失敗学で知られる政府事故調の畑村洋太郎元委員長は、報告書の総括で「あり得ることは起こる。あり得ないと思うことも起こる」と述べた。その反省はどこへいってしまったのか。
The government's investigation committee interviewed 772 individuals in connection with the Fukushima disaster. There must be many valuable opinions that have yet to be made public.
政府事故調は７７２人もの関係者から事情を聴いている。ほかにも貴重な論点が隠されているに違いない。
TEPCO must reveal every aspect of the mass desertion, and waste no time in doing so. The utility cannot be entrusted with nuclear power plant operations so long as it refuses to face the issue head-on.
東京電力はただちに事実関係を明らかにすべきだ。この問題を正面から議論せずに原発運転を任せることはできない。
For its part, the government should disclose all investigation committee materials to the public and make every effort to ensure that people learn lessons from the Fukushima accident. In the absence of any such effort, we firmly oppose the restart of reactors that are currently off-line.
政府は事故調の資料をすべて公開し、「福島の教訓」を国民的にくみ取る努力を尽くすべきだ。それなしに、再稼働へ突き進むことに反対する。
--The Asahi Shimbun, May 21
EDITORIAL: Startling Fukushima testimony raises grave questions
原発事故証言―再稼働より全容公開だ
When faced with a life-threatening crisis, humans do not necessarily behave according to set rules. Some will do anything to save their skins. Without factoring in this possibility, is it ever possible to design something that is guaranteed to be safe?
危機が極まった局面では、人間は必ずしも規則通りには動かない。自らの命を優先する者もいる。それを計算に入れずに、どう安全を設計できるのか。
We raise the issue because of a document that recently came to light. It is a record of statements made by Masao Yoshida, who was the manager of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant at the time of the March 2011 disaster. Yoshida died last July of esophageal cancer.
This valuable document covers exchanges Yoshida made when he was questioned by the government's Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Co.
福島第一原発の元所長、吉田昌郎（まさお）氏（昨年１２月に死去）の証言を記録した「吉田調書」の内容が明らかになった。
The document begs a fundamental question: Is it right to entrust operations of nuclear power plants to electric power companies that are private enterprises?
貴重な証言を読むと、根源的な疑問が浮かぶ。原発とは、一民間企業である電力会社に任せていいものなのか、と。
According to the document, Yoshida said that on March 15, four days after the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami crippled the Fukushima No. 1 plant, fears were being voiced that the plant's No. 2 reactor containment vessel was damaged or destroyed. At that most critical juncture, according to the document, about 90 percent of plant workers defied Yoshida's orders and fled to the Fukushima No. 2 plant, about 10 kilometers away, to seek temporary refuge.
政府の事故調査委員会による調書によると、発生４日後だった。原子炉そのものが壊れるかもしれない。その最悪の事態が心配されたとき、所員の９割が命令に反して１０キロ余り離れた別の原発に一時退避したという。
Doubts have always existed about the efficacy of disaster response measures at nuclear power plants. Would any utility really order its workers to risk their lives and keep performing their duties? How many workers would the utility be able to continue to secure during an accident? At Fukushima, these questions were no longer just theoretical.
原発の事故対応をめぐる疑問は以前からあった。電力会社は原発運転員らに「命が危なくても残って作業せよ」と命じられるのか。どこまで必要な人員を確保し続けられるのか。そう危惧される事態が実際に起きていたのである。
The safety of commercial nuclear power plants today can be maintained only if plant operators deal appropriately with any mishap. The more serious the situation, the more people are needed to contain the crisis. But unlike Self-Defense Forces personnel, police officers and firefighters, who are all special-status government workers, nuclear power plant operators are private-sector workers.
現在の商業用原発は、異常が起きた場合、運転員が適切に対応して初めて安全が保たれる。深刻な状況になればなるほど、対応には人手が必要になる。だが、自衛官や警察官、消防士など特殊な公務員と違い、原発運転員は民間従業員である。
The 50 or so workers who stayed at the Fukushima No. 1 plant while the crisis unfolded came to be called the "Fukushima 50" and were lauded around the world for their heroic dedication. But there is no guarantee such heroism will come into play when the next nuclear crisis occurs. The document raises grave questions.
当時、現場に残って献身的に働いた約５０人は「フクシマ・フィフティー」と呼ばれ、世界から称賛された。だが、次の事故でもそんな英雄的精神が発揮される保証はない。吉田調書は重大な問題を投げかけている。
Yet, Shunichi Tanaka, chairman of the Nuclear Regulation Authority, was reportedly not even aware of the document's existence. We find it extremely hard to understand that the head of this organization, created to prevent a recurrence of nuclear crisis, was not familiar with all the details from the outset of the Fukushima disaster.
ところが原子力規制委員会の田中俊一委員長は調書の存在自体知らなかったという。事故を繰り返さないために生まれた規制組織が、事故の詳細を把握していないとは理解に苦しむ。
The possibility of plant workers deserting en masse during a crisis was not even raised during discussions last year on establishing new regulatory standards for nuclear power plants.
原発の新しい規制基準が昨年つくられる過程でも、事故時の運転員たちの離脱は、その可能性さえ議論されてこなかった。
Yotaro Hatamura, an expert in the science of failures and former chairman of the government's investigation committee on the Fukushima accident, stated in the overview of the investigation report: "Whatever may happen will happen. Whatever is thought to never happen will also happen." Has nobody heeded Hatamura's warning?
失敗学で知られる政府事故調の畑村洋太郎元委員長は、報告書の総括で「あり得ることは起こる。あり得ないと思うことも起こる」と述べた。その反省はどこへいってしまったのか。
The government's investigation committee interviewed 772 individuals in connection with the Fukushima disaster. There must be many valuable opinions that have yet to be made public.
政府事故調は７７２人もの関係者から事情を聴いている。ほかにも貴重な論点が隠されているに違いない。
TEPCO must reveal every aspect of the mass desertion, and waste no time in doing so. The utility cannot be entrusted with nuclear power plant operations so long as it refuses to face the issue head-on.
東京電力はただちに事実関係を明らかにすべきだ。この問題を正面から議論せずに原発運転を任せることはできない。
For its part, the government should disclose all investigation committee materials to the public and make every effort to ensure that people learn lessons from the Fukushima accident. In the absence of any such effort, we firmly oppose the restart of reactors that are currently off-line.
政府は事故調の資料をすべて公開し、「福島の教訓」を国民的にくみ取る努力を尽くすべきだ。それなしに、再稼働へ突き進むことに反対する。
--The Asahi Shimbun, May 21
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